Using rich data on the international transactions of intermediate inputs by French firms we document the extent of international second sourcing, the simultaneous use of outsourcing and FDI to procure the same input, or using outsourcing or FDI from different locations. We also explore the firm and component characteristics that make procurement of this type more likely. Initial investigations suggest that international second sourcing is important: indeed in terms of both the number and value of transactions of intermediate inputs they represent the dominant pattern of procurement.
Introduction
Extensions to the models of firm boundaries to include the costs of offshoring by Antras (2003) , Antras and Helpman (2004) and others, have greatly enriched economists" understanding of the complex patterns that appear in the trade of intermediate inputs between firms in different countries. Firms source inputs from abroad; they offshore, to take advantage of lower production costs, but can then choose procurement either through a vertically integrated affiliate or by outsourcing the production. That choice between offshoring, outsourcing and FDI has now been shown in this literature to be affected by a wide range of input, final good, firm and country characteristics (see for example the review by Helpman, 2006) .
In this paper, we follow Antras (2003) , Yeaple (2006) , Marin (2006) , Bernard et al., (2010) and Costinot et al., (2009) in focusing on how input characteristics determine the type of overseas procurement, but do so in an empirical environment where it is possible to distinguish between the mode of offshoring (outsourcing and vertical integration) for each input, by each firm. As previously identified by Jabbour (2008) , Defever and Toubal (2007) , Corcos et al., (2009) and Kohler and Smolka (2009) , data of this type has the advantage that it brings the empirical model closer to the firm level decision emphasised within the theory. The motivation to focus on the characteristics of these offshored inputs in such an environment comes from Acemoglu et al. (2009) who, in the context of domestic outsourcing versus vertical integration, provide evidence which shows that the results can be used to test between model assumptions. 2 The basis for many of the recent models of offshoring that include the choice between outsourcing and FDI, has been the property rights models of firm boundaries outlined in Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) . Important within this approach are the concepts of incomplete contracts and the idea that some investments are highly specific to the production of a particular input (Helpman, 2006) . Those parties with a weak outside option, and therefore weak bargaining power in the ex-post renegotiation to set prices and bargain over rents that occurs, fear being "held-up" and not receiving the full marginal return on their investment. For inputs where these investments are a feature the optimal integration strategy depends on the party realising the specific investment, where that party should control ownership rights. The greater the importance of the relationship specific investment made by the purchaser of the input the more likely it will be supplied through a vertically integrated affiliate. In contrast, when the relationship specific investment made by the supplier is the relatively more important, the more likely the firm will outsource production (Acemoglu et al., 2009) .
That prediction of a negative relationship between the investment of the input supplier and the likelihood the firm will choose vertical integration as the mode of supply in the property rights model matches results found for domestic sourcing by Acemoglu et al. (2009) . It is however, the opposite of that estimated in the offshoring literature for similar measures of relationship specificity but using the share of intra-firm trade in total imports as measure of vertical integration (Antras, 2003; Yeaple, 2006; and Bernard et al., 2010) .
3 Using a combination of information on UK firms and their plants and input output tables, Acemoglu et al. (2009) generate a measure of the mode of supply according to whether a firm owns a domestic plant producing an input used in the production of a given product. Their results
show a positive correlation between the R&D intensity of the purchaser and vertical integration and a negative correlation for the R&D intensity of the input supplier. In Antras,
, Yeaple (2006) and Bernard et al. (2010) the share of trade between affiliates of the same firm in different countries in total trade is found to be positively correlated with a broader range of measures of relationship specificity including the R&D intensity and the investment intensity of the input.
One aspect of the contribution we make in this paper is to test the robustness of the results from Acemoglu et al. (2009) to the use of data that identifies outsourcing and vertical integration in a different way, 4 for a different country, and for offshored inputs. We anticipate that this latter point may have some bearing on the results. Although traditionally applied in models of horizontal FDI, and therefore the choice between FDI and licensing, the internalisation decision of Dunning"s OLI framework captures aspects of the boundaries of the firm for example. Models of this type are reviewed in Markusen (1995) and include discussions of aspects of knowledge capital such as the non-excludability of knowledge, asymmetric information, moral hazard, adverse selection and incomplete contracting. 5 These 3 It also differs compared to the transactions costs theory of firm boundaries (Acemoglu et al., 2009 ). The transaction costs theory assumes that when asset specificity is significant vertical integration is optimal because it reduces opportunistic behaviour by one or both parties. 4 Our data contains information on the relationship with the supplier (and the origin country) for each offshored input negating the need to make an assumption that all vertically integrated inputs are produced in separate plants. 5 Indeed Antras and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) suggest that incorporating the non-appropriable nature of knowledge on the internationalisation decision offers a fruitful line of future research on this topic. models predict that the firm will establish an affiliate overseas in order to prevent aspects of its firm-specific knowledge from leaking out to rivals, to maintain reputation etc. In support of this Costinot et al. (2009) explain the importance of R&D on the share on intra-firm trade in their estimations as simultaneous support from both the knowledge capital model and the property rights model. In our specification these effects would tend to work in opposite directions. The R&D intensity of the input makes it more likely that the firm will vertically integrate production under the knowledge capital model, but less likely if it is a measure of relationship specificity. 6 We find from this exercise strong support for the property rights model of firm boundaries when applied to data on offshored inputs. The probability of purchasing inputs through vertical integration is higher the lower is the investment or human capital intensity of the input, and the higher is the share of the input in total costs. We also find that these input characteristics matter more, they are more likely to determine the patterns of procurement that we observe, when the investment relationship specific investments made by the purchaser are less important. The characteristics of the input are in general unimportant when the investment, R&D or human capital intensity of the purchaser is high.
The exception to this is for the technological intensity of the input. In contrast to the evidence in Acemoglu et al. (2009) for domestic procurement we do not find that the technological intensity of the input, except when the investment intensity of the producer is above average, is a significant determinant of the mode of offshoring. We interpret this as evidence that
suggests that other models of offshoring, such as the knowledge capital model, may also play an important role.
We compare our results with those found when using the share of intra-firm imports in total imports as the dependent variable. Here we find evidence that closely correlates with those found for the US; the share of intra-firm trade increases with investment, human capital and R&D intensity. This would seem to suggest that differences in the type of data, and not the country context, explain the differences between our results and those found previously in the literature. Finally, we test the robustness of our findings to changes in the sample of firms and for possible selection bias.
6 Costinot et al. (2009) also develop a model offshoring with (routine) tasks. They generate a measure of routineness that they then use in their empirical work. Unfortunately we find that this measure is too aggregated to be used in our empirical work.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows; the following section presents a brief review of the theoretical and empirical literature on offshoring and highlights the contribution of this paper to the empirical literature. Section 3 describes the data and presents the estimation methodology. Section 4 discusses the results while section 5 presents concluding remarks.
Empirical Literature on Offshoring
The empirical literature on offshoring might be broadly categorised into three types. In the first group might be placed those studies that model how input and country characteristics affect the share of intra-firm trade in total imports of a particular product. A second group compares the characteristics of those firms that offshore, outsource or are multinationals, while a final group focuses primarily on firm, final good and country variables. We review each branch of this literature in turn.
Thus far the bulk of the empirical work on the mode of offshoring has centred on a set of predictions taken from the property rights models of offshoring. These include whether capital intensive (measured by the capital intensity of the export industry) imports are more likely to be produced inside the firm and sourced from capital abundant countries. Antras the characteristics of the input have however proved less robust. Yeaple (2006) finds that the share of intra-firm imports is increasing in the R&D intensity of the industry, but like Antras (2003) finds no role for human capital intensity. In contrast Nunn and Trefler (2008) and Bernard et al. (2010) find a positive correlation with human capital. Bernard et al. (2010) also find that product contractibility, measured by the level of intermediation, leads to lower levels of imports from vertically integrated suppliers.
Drawing on the extensions of the model to allow for firm heterogeneity (Antras and Helpman, 2004) , the empirical literature has also consistently found that firms that have affiliates abroad, or import goods and services, are different from those firms that do not. Tomiura , 2009 ), Criscuolo and Leaver (2005 , Kurz (2006) and Görg et al. (2007) model a firm"s decision to outsource and find that more productive firms are more likely to outsource for example. In a more complete test Tomiura (2007) compares the characteristics of those firms that are engaged in FDI and international outsourcing for Japan, finding that those firms which undertake FDI are more productive than those that offshore by outsourcing.
Most recently a number of studies have begun to include firm, industry and country level as determinants of the type of offshoring. Jabbour (2008) and Defever and Toubal (2007) use the same data source as this paper, that on the international transactions of French firms, while Corcos et al. (2009) supplement this with additional data on international trade by French firms. In each case the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the firm buys an input from a given country through outsourcing or FDI, and in the case of Jabbour (2008) also through partnerships. Defever and Toubal (2007) focus on a small number of explanatory variables, suggested from a theoretical model of offshoring they develop. Their main explanatory variables are a measure of productivity of the firm, the quality of the contracting environment in the exporting country and what they label as the supplier"s input intensity of production. 7 Jabbour (2008) in contrast is focused on testing a larger number of predictions from the recent theoretical models of offshoring, in particular the relative productivity of those firms choosing international outsourcing versus FDI, as well as country characteristics such as capital intensity, the quality of the legal system and market thickness and input characteristics such as capital and R&D intensity. Corcos et al (2009) are interested in the robustness of a similar set of variables, in particular those on firm characteristics, to a broader sample of firms. Of these Corcos et al. (2009) include a sub-set of the input characteristics (human and physical capital) that we use in this paper, although provide no discussion of the results that emerge. They find that the probability of FDI is increasing in the physical and human capital intensity of the input.
Data and Empirical Specification
The data on international transactions of intermediate inputs we use in this paper is from the "International Intra-Group Exchanges" (IIGE) survey conducted by the French Ministry of Economy via the SESSI (Service Des Etudes Statistiques Industrielles) for the year 1999.
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This survey covers all manufacturing firms that own an affiliate located outside of France (where ownership is defined as holding at least 50 per cent of the equity). The IIGE sample is not designed as a census or stratified random sample of all firms that offshore within 7 This later variable is measured at the firm level and is calculated as the share in total output of all externally supplied inputs, where the numerator is defined by the total amount of inputs supplied to the firm by independent and affiliated suppliers irrespective of their location. They predict that outsourcing is more likely the greater is the share of output that a firm produces externally (the greater is the supplier"s input intensity). 8 This survey was conducted in order to draw a clear picture of the organisation and of the structure of international trade by French firms. One of the main objectives of the survey was to analyse the strategy of French firms, and especially French groups, toward globalisation and how this strategy is affecting the organisation of their international trade transactions. We provide further information on the method through which the IIGE sample was collected within the Appendix.
France. Indeed, Corcos et al. (2009) In Table 1 we provide information on the number of firms on which we have information for each industry, the number of inputs firms in that industry offshored, the average number of offshored inputs per firm and the method of offshoring according to the industry of the purchaser. In Table 2 we present information according to the industry of the input. As is evident from Table 1 we have a relatively modest number of firms per industry, but on average these firms purchased between 4 (printing and publishing) and 15 (leather & wearing apparel) inputs from abroad. The most common method of procurement for firms was through outsourcing, although there is variation across industries. Outsourcing accounted for 90 per cent or more of the total inputs purchased by firms in the food, leather and other transport industries. In contrast less than 75 per cent of inputs in the electric and electronic products and electronic component industries were purchased through outsourcing.
9 A small number of observations within the dataset use both outsourcing and FDI. We follow Defever and Toubal (2008) and Corcos et al. (2009) in choosing to exclude this data. 10 This coverage ratio varies across industries; from 3.9% in the leather and wearing apparel industry to 30% in the pharmaceutical industry. 11 We measure the total number of firms on the basis of the firm annual survey for the year 1999. The firm annual survey covers only the firms with more than twenty employees. Small firms are not accounted for in the survey and in our calculations.
From Table 2 it is evident that even when organised according to the industry of the input outsourcing is the most common method of overseas procurement, although both outsourcing and FDI are again present for all types of input. Differences across industries remain, although perhaps slightly smaller than in Table 1 . Outsourcing is most common in the production of leather, textiles and wood and paper and least common in pharmaceuticals, electric products and electronic components and printing and publishing.
In Table 3 we show the ten countries the French firms in our data most frequently purchase inputs from. Together these ten countries account for 77 per cent of the total number of transactions. Aside from China, which itself accounts for just 2.1 per cent of the observations, all are OECD countries. Germany is by the far the most common source country, with just under 1/5 th of all observations, while the other neighbours of France (Italy, Belgium, UK, Netherlands, and Spain) are also frequently used. The US accounts for just over 6 per cent of the observations, and Japan 2.4 per cent.
We explore the determinants of outsourcing versus vertical integration using the pair of regressions set out in equations 1 and 2 below, which we estimate as a probit regression. In equations (1) and (2) y is a zero-one variable denoting whether a firm i producing product j imports an input k from an overseas affiliate (y=1: if FDI) or from an unrelated party (y=0: if outsourcing). In equation 2 we additionally allow this choice to vary across countries, denoted by c.
Differences in the information content of the data mean that this dependent variable differs from that used by Acemoglu et al. (2009) . There the dependent variable is a measure of whether firm i producing product j owns a plant that produces an input k. To identify relevant inputs they use information on the output of plants at the SIC 4-digit industry level. An important assumption made in their analysis is that all inputs produced within the boundaries of the firm are manufactured in separate plants. In addition, this information on the output of plants is available only for production units located in the UK. We are, arguably, able to identify vertically integrated inputs more accurately, but only for those inputs that are imported.
This procurement choice is assumed to be determined by a set of variables that measure the characteristics of inputs, which we discuss below, as well a series of dummy variables that are used to control for firm, input and country characteristics. In order to control for the effect of the sampling structure on the relationship with the mode of offshoring, and any firm characteristics (observable or unobservable) that determine this choice, we include in the regression a full set of firm dummies. Identification of the relationship between input characteristics and the method of offshoring procurement therefore comes from the variation in those choices within firms. In order to establish whether our results are due to some omitted input characteristics we additionally include a full set of input dummies, measured at the 2-digit level. In this regression this further restricts identification of the effect of the input variables to the variation within 2-digit HS products. Finally, in equation 2 we include a full set of country effects. Again this removes differences in country characteristics as a possible explanation for our results for input characteristics.
An implication of the inclusion of a large number of dummy variables within the estimating equation is that firms that import solely using FDI or outsourcing are perfectly identified and dropped. Our final sample is therefore 5,179 observations at the firm-input level and 20,599
at the firm-input-country level across some 609 firms. Of those firms that are dropped from the regression we calculate that most, 61 per cent, are firms that have only used outsourcing. The firms dropped from the sample can be shown to be different to the 609 firms included in the final sample. For completeness in Table 4 we report the firm characteristics on those firms in the broader sample as well as this sub-sample of the total number of observations. As is evident from this table the firms in the narrower sample of 609 firms are on average smaller, while there is some suggestion they are less productive, more likely to be foreign owned and investment intensive. If the effect of the input characteristics on the type of offshoring does not differ according to the characteristics of firms then this should not affect the generality of our findings. To test the robustness of our results to this point, in Table 14 we consider the replacement of firm fixed effects with a set of firm characteristics that include, productivity, capital intensity, average wage and ownership, and which allow us to use the full sample of firms. We leave the detail of how these firm level variables are constructed to the Appendix. In Table 3 we report the distribution of countries within our final sample. Comparing the two columns in Table 3 suggests little effect from restricting the number of firms for the distribution of source countries within the data.
We refer within our analysis to a firm as a separate legal entity that has its own separate managerial structure. A firm can be made up of a collection of plants, which we also refer to as affiliates. A firm-group is defined as a collection of firms that are under the control of a single (holding) company. In the IIGE survey, intra-group trade is defined as trade between affiliates (i.e. plants) of the same group. Therefore while the IIGE survey is sent to firms, the same level of observation as the EAE data, the survey asks firms to identify as intra firm trade transactions that take place within the same group of firms. These intra-firm trades are therefore at a more aggregated level of ownership and can include trade between domestic firms and foreign plants for which the direct managerial relationship is at a different (higher) level. It is possible to identify the firms that make up an international industrial group within the data, but we are unable to identify which foreign plants belong to which firm within the group. In our base regressions we follow Corcos et al. (2009), Defever and Toubal (2008) and Jabbour (2008) and assume in the analysis that the intra-group international exchanges relate to intra-firm international exchanges. We test the robustness of this assumption by also presenting evidence at the firm-group level. To ensure direct comparability, and because we have no additional information on the characteristics of the group, its size or productivity for example, we include in these group level regressions firm-group effects. We find that this assumption does not affect our results for the input variables.
The firm effects included in our estimating equation will also capture the characteristics of the industry of the purchaser. Here it is more difficult to justify an assumption that the relationship of the input variables with the choice between FDI and outsourcing will not vary according to the product being produced, indeed it is this theoretical prediction that the relative importance of asset specificity that motivates the current analysis. To capture this we consider the effect of splitting the sample according to the characteristics of the industry of the purchaser. These industry characteristics are measured in a similar way to those of inputs.
Input Characteristics
Aside from the HS classification of the input and the relationship with the purchaser we have little direct information on the characteristics of the inputs purchased by French firms or on the firm that produced it. We therefore follow the existing literature and use industry level information to proxy for this. While this places a restrictive assumption that inputs purchased by different firms, in different industries, from different countries are identical in their characteristics on the analysis, according to Antras and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) it has the advantage of reducing the possible endogeneity of the measures of relationship specific investment that we use. The property rights model predicts that firm-specific measures of relationship specificity including capital, R&D and skill intensity, will be affected by the final integration decision chosen. To further reduce this bias for several of the measures we use industry data for the US.
We capture the relationship specific investments made by the supplier of the input using information on the equipment intensity, skill intensity and technological intensity of the industry. Equipment intensity is measured as investment expenditures on equipments over value-added and is from the NBER production database for the US (at the 4-digit level). Skill intensity is measured as share of non-production workers in the total wage bill, again for the US and from the same source. We measure the technological intensity of the purchased input using data from the French R&D survey at the 4-digit level for 1999. As in Acemoglu et al. (2009) this is calculated as the ratio of R&D expenditures to total value added of the input"s industry (where value added includes that of both firms that conduct R&D and those that do not). In those regressions where we do not include firm specific fixed effects we measure technological intensity of the purchaser in a similar way.
In Table 5 we report the average characteristics of these three input specificity measures in the data as a whole and when the input is offshored through outsourcing or FDI. The differences between the averages in the table are relatively modest. To the extent that there are differences it would seem that those inputs that are more technologically intensive, investment and skill intensive are more likely to be purchased from an affiliated supplier. 12 We also add to the regression a set of other input characteristics that might determine the method of overseas procurement. Firstly, Grossman and Helpman, (2005) have previously argued that in thicker markets the probability of finding a suitable partner increases and the viability of outsourcing improves. To capture the availability of specialised suppliers we include the Rauch (1999) measure of product differentiation. This indicated whether the input is sold on an organised exchange or reference priced or not. This is available at the 6 digit level and so we use the simple average of this data within a given HS4 digit code. We add to this a measure of the number of suppliers. This variable is constructed as the total number, expressed in natural logarithm, of active establishments at the 2-digits product level across OECD countries. The data is extracted from the OECD Structural Business and Demographic Database for 1999. In Table 5 we find that products that are purchased from an affiliated supplier (through FDI) are less likely to be reference priced or sold on an organised exchange, and come from industries in which the number of possible suppliers are fewer, although again these differences are slight.
Finally, we follow Acemoglu et al. (2009) in including the input cost share as a determinant of the method of overseas procurement. We measure this as the ratio of the imported value of the input over the firm"s total cost, where total costs are measured as the sum of the wage bill, the taxes and input purchases. Of the input characteristics that we use this is perhaps the most likely to be endogenous. Production of an input is offshored because it can be purchased from overseas firms at a lower cost. In the absence of an appropriate instrument, to reduce the possible effect this may have on the results, we instead construct five categories of cost: less than 5% of total costs; 5%-10%; 10%-20%; 20%-50% and greater than 50% of total costs. Table 6 provides information on these variables. Interestingly most transactions are a very small percentage of total costs: 88 per cent of the transactions are less than 5 per cent of total costs and a further 5.7 per cent are between 5 and 10 per cent. We also present in the table the percentage of observations within each of the 5 different ranges of cost share that involve, FDI or outsourcing, while in the final row we present the share of the total transactions by procurement method within the sample more generally.
Of interest are the deviations of each cell from the figure for all observations in the final row.
The most obvious pattern within the data is that inputs imported through FDI are much more prevalent within the data when the share of the input in total costs is higher than 20 per cent.
Correspondingly transactions involving outsourcing are more common when the value of the transaction in total costs is small. For example, outsourcing accounts for 84 per cent of the transactions with a value of less than 5 per cent and 75 per cent when the value is above 50 per cent. In contrast offshoring using affiliates within the same group accounts for 16 per cent of transactions of less than 5 per cent and 25 per cent when the value is above 50 per cent. This evidence would appear to suggest that this variable is likely to be a strong predictor of the type of offshoring that we observe.
Econometric Evidence
In Table 7 we report the results from our estimation of equation 1 and in Table 8 those from the estimation of equation 2 where the model is extended to include information on the country of origin of the input. All coefficients are the estimated marginal effects, calculated at the mean of the right hand side variables. As a reminder, in order to concentrate on the variation in procurement within a firm, all regressions in Tables 7 and 8 include a full set of firm dummies. To control for any country characteristics that may affect this choice in Table   8 we additionally include a full set of country dummies. In regressions 7.2 and 8.2 we consider the robustness of our results to the inclusion of input dummies at the 2-digit level. In these regressions we assume that any omitted input characteristics affect the FDI, outsourcing choice at the 2-digit level, meaning that the significance of our input characteristics is identified from the within 2-digit variation (within firms and countries). Our results are largely robust to their inclusion and we retain their use through the remaining regressions within the paper.
We find consistent evidence that a number of aspects of the characteristics of inputs matter for the method of offshoring that is chosen. The results for the measures of relationship specificity are robust across the tables. In both Tables 7 and Table 8 we find that equipment intensity and skill intensity of the input significantly affects the choice between outsourcing and vertical integration, whereas technological intensity does not. The equipment and skill variables also have the expected negative signs. The greater is the relationship specific investment required by the supplier of the input the more likely it is that its production will be outsourced. Consistent with Acemoglu et al. (2009) the results for equipment intensity and skill intensity appear to offer support for the property rights model of firm boundaries over the transactions costs model even when applied to offshored inputs.
The marginal effect also suggests that there are differences in the magnitude of the types of input characteristics on the type of offshoring. According to regression 7.2 a 1 unit increase in equipment intensity reduces the probability of FDI by 6 percentage points, while in regression 8.2 the effect from the same change is 3 percentage points. The estimated marginal of skill intensity on the type of offshoring is even stronger. A one unit increase in skill intensity is associated with a 22 percentage point decrease in the probability of supply through an overseas affiliate (regression 7.2), and a 19 percentage point decrease when we add information on countries in Table 8 (regression 8.2). According to the information in Table 5 the standard deviation of investment intensity is around 7 times greater than that of skill intensity however, suggesting that the investment intensity variable will explain more of the differences in the type of offshoring observed in the data.
We develop these points in Figures 1 and 2 , where we display the estimated probability of choosing FDI over outsourcing at different values of investment intensity and skill intensity (with all other right hand side variables set at their mean values), along with 95 per cent confidence intervals for those estimates. As the figures make clear the effect of both investment and skill intensity on the probability of using FDI is relatively small, although this is in line with the variation in the procurement method across industries displayed in Table 1 .
Across the full range of values for investment intensity the probability varies between 0.19 when investment intensity is low and 0.12 when investment intensity is at its highest. For skill intensity the corresponding figures are 0.17 when the skill intensity of the input is high to 0.13 when skill intensity is at its lowest value within the data.
The insignificant effect of technological intensity on the type of offshoring contrasts with that found for domestic procurement by Acemoglu et al. (2009) . Its insignificance might be explained because it is not an input characteristic that matters for French firms overseas procurement choices. An alternative explanation might instead be that this variable captures both aspects of the knowledge capital model and the property rights model. A similar interpretation is made by Costinot et al. (2009) for why this variable has the strongest effect on the share of intra trade, whereas in our specification these effects would tend to work in opposite directions. The R&D intensity of the input makes it more likely the firm will vertically integrate the production under the knowledge capital model, but less likely if it is a measure of relationship specificity and, as the equipment variable suggests, the property right model has some simultaneous support. We return to this point below where we separate the sample according to the investment and R&D intensity of the producer.
Of the remaining input characteristics the cost share variable has the strongest effect on the mode of procurement. We find that an input is more likely to be internally sourced through FDI when its share in total costs rises above 20 per cent. Below this level the relationship between the producer and supplier would appear unimportant. Acemoglu et al. (2009) argue from similar evidence for the UK that this lends support to the property rights model of firm boundaries. The more important the input is to the final goods producer, the greater is its share in total costs, the more likely the final good producer will choose to integrate its production. In practice it would seem likely that this is a result common to most models of offshoring however. The estimated marginal effects reported for this regression are again large. Inputs that account for more than 20 per cent of total costs are between 25 and 30 percentage points more likely to be offshored, depending on the specification, through FDI rather than outsourcing. In Figure 3 we show how the probability of using FDI changes for different values of investment intensity and at different levels of cost share. As the figure makes clear the cost share variable has a strong effect on this probability. Combined with the effect of investment intensity the estimated probability now lies between 0.31 for the least investment intensive inputs that account for the greatest share of costs, to 0.16 for those inputs with the highest investment intensity and the lowest cost share.
When we condition on country factors in Table 8 there are some differences for this variable.
Perhaps of greatest surprise the over 50 per cent cost share variable is no longer statistically significant, while the marginal effect on the dummy indicating that the cost share is between 20-50 per cent falls by around one-third compared to the previous table. This would seem to suggest that some inputs that are important within the production process are sourced from particular countries. Which countries, and the characteristics of those countries, we leave as an avenue for future research.
In contrast to the three measures most commonly used to identify relationship specificity the number of input suppliers, which we include as a measure of market thickness has no effect in the regressions. We do however find a positive association between the degree of product heterogeneity developed by Rauch (1999) and the method of procurement. The estimated marginal effect of this input characteristic is about the same size, but oppositely signed to that for equipment intensity, in regression 7.2. The ordering reverses in regression 8.2 in Table 8 , with the marginal effect on the product heterogeneity variable now the larger. The greater the degree of differentiation of HS6 digit products within a 4-digit HS category the more likely it is that the input will be vertically integrated. It follows that goods sold on organised exchanges, or reference priced are more likely to be outsourced.
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Finally in Tables 7 and 8 we repeat the estimation of regressions 7.3 and 8.3 but at the firmgroup rather than the firm level. While this represents an aggregation of the data, and would therefore normally be expected to lead to a fall in the number of observations, the number of observations actually increases because the number of perfectly identified firms (which are dropped from the regression) is reduced. The differences compared to the firm level regressions are minor, and are confined to the cost share variable. The 20-50 per cent cost share dummy ceases to be significant in Table 7 , while that on the dummy indicating that the input accounts for more than 10-20 per cent becomes significant. Finally the dummy indicating that the input accounts for more than 50 per cent is now significant in Table 8, while that between 5-10 per cent is no longer so. Perhaps the bigger effect of using group rather than firm level data is the drop in the size of the estimated marginal effects, which universally fall in size. 13 It is worth noting that this is not the measure of contract intensity developed using Rauch"s product classification by Nunn (2007) , which has previously been interpreted as a measure of relationship specificity. A variable based on that measure could not be meaningfully included in our specification. Nunn calculates his measure based on the US input-output tables. It therefore captures the contract intensity of the total production process of the firm (i.e. it does not vary across the inputs used by the firm). This variable would therefore be perfectly correlated in our specification with the firm effects. A similar variable could of course be constructed for each input used by the firm, where this would capture the contract intensity of the production of that input. However, under an assumption that the optimal integration strategy is determined independently at each stage of the production process, such a variable would capture the likelihood that the input producer was integrated with the supplier of its inputs.
Are differences explained by the context or the methodology?
A question that might be asked about the above findings is whether they are driven by differences in the empirical specification compared to the existing offshoring literature, or whether they can be explained by the use of French data. To explore this point in Tables 9 and 10 we reconstruct the measure of offshoring adopted in the previous literature, the share of intra-firm trade in total imports, but using our data for French firms.
14 In Table 9 we calculate this share for each HS 4-digit input and in Table 10 for each combination of input and country.
These results suggest very strongly that the differences in our findings compared to the previous literature arise because of differences in the question and not the use of French data. For our three measures of relationship specificity we find a positive and significant association with the share of intra-firm imports for R&D intensity and skill intensity in both Tables 9 and 10, while that for equipment intensity is positive in both, but significant in Table   10 only. The results for the technological intensity variable are perhaps most striking, given the lack of significance of the same measure in Tables 7 and 8 . In line with Costinot et al.
(2009) we also find that the effect of changes in the technological intensity of the input is the strongest. As already noted, they argue that this occurs because of support from both the property rights and the knowledge capital model.
The exact source of the difference between the two sets of regressions is beyond the scope of the paper. Suggestions for its occurrence might however, focus on the fact that whereas Tables 7 and 8 focus just on the extensive margin between outsourcing and FDI, those in Tables 9 and 10 include the effects of the intensive margin. That would require that the relationship between investment intensity, skill intensity, R&D and the intensive margin of offshoring is the reverse of that of the extensive margin. Firms are less likely to organise the production of inputs through FDI when relationship specificity is high, but purchase those inputs in larger quantities when they do. An alternative explanation might be that the share of intra-firm trade ignores information on the industries that are purchasing those inputs. As we show below, the characteristics of the industry of the purchaser appears to affect the relationship between input characteristics and the mode of offshoring. For example, in 14 Corcos et al. (2009) undertake a similar exercise to that found here.
contrast to the results presented thus far in some versions of the model we find a significant positive relationship between R&D and the mode of offshoring, while those for skill and investment intensity are insignificant.
Relative Input Characteristics
Within the property rights model of firm boundaries the decision to source the supply of an input from an affiliated or unaffiliated firm is determined according to the relative importance of the relationship specific investments made by each party. This raises the possibility that the coefficients on each of the input variables will be affected by the characteristics of the industry of the purchaser of the input. We have so far controlled for these effect in the above regressions, under an assumption of their independence, using a full set of firm effects. In this section we consider this possibility by separating the sample according to whether the industry of the producer lies above or below the mean level of investment intensity (Table   11 ), technological intensity (Table 12) , and human capital (skill) intensity (Table13). In each table we continue to report the results using the aggregation of the data ignoring country variation (regressions 1 and 2 in each Table) and results that includes this information (regressions 3 and 4).
The general pattern across the three tables is for the number of significant input characteristics to fall when we use data from industries that have above average investment, skill or R&D intensity. This would appear consistent with the interpretation that the greater are the investments made by the purchaser of the input into human capital, physical capital or R&D the less important are the characteristics of the input itself in discriminating between the types of offshoring that are observed. When the investments made by the purchaser are less important the characteristics of the input play a more important role. There are some deviations from this general pattern that are worthy of some discussion.
Perhaps most obvious in this regard is the difference in the sign on the R&D intensity variable in regression 11.1. For firms that are in industries with above mean levels of investment intensity the probability of using FDI to purchase inputs is increasing in the R&D intensity of the input, whereas for firms in industries with below mean levels of investment intensity the probability of using FDI is decreasing in the R&D intensity of the input. We take from this that the R&D variable does indeed capture both relationship specific investment and firm specific knowledge. Where the RSI made by the firm is more important (regression 11.1), we find evidence consistent with knowledge capital model.
This does not hold when we include information on the country from which the input was purchased (regression 11.3). This would seem to suggest that the country effects are capturing the variation identified in regression 11.1 using the technology intensity variable.
This might be because R&D activity is clustered within a relatively small number of countries (Keller, 2004) . This would tend to be supported by the information in Table 3 , where the countries most commonly used to purchase inputs by our sample of French firms are almost exclusively OECD countries. In support of this view, the equipment intensity also ceases to be significant in regression 11.3, while the marginal effect on the skill intensity variable falls by one-third.
The other noticeable change that occurs between regressions 11.1 and 11.2 in Table 11 is the significance of the product diversity variable in regression 11.2. Products that are sold on an organised exchange or referenced priced are no less likely to be outsourced or bought from an overseas affiliate when the investment intensity of the industry of the producer is above the mean. The same variable is significant and positive when we consider firms in industries with below mean investment intensity. Here the estimated marginal effect from a one unit change in product diversity is 8 percentage points.
One final difference of note is the size of the marginal effect on the skill intensity variable when comparing across the regressions without country level information (regressions 11.1 and 11.2) and those with country information (regressions 11.3 and 11.4). The skill intensity used in the production of the input is a much more important determinant of the method of offshoring when the capital intensity of the industry of the purchaser is higher than that estimated in Table 7 . The difference in the size of the marginal effect falls is smaller in regressions 11.3 and 11.4, again which seems to suggest that the between country variation in the data may explain an important part of the results form regressions 11.1 and 11.2.
In Table 12 we perform the same exercise for the R&D intensity of the purchaser. Again there are marked differences between the regressions 12.1 (12.3) and 12.2 (12.4). When the R&D intensity of the purchasers" industry is above the mean, only the cost share of the input matters for the method of procurement. When we use the transaction level data we additionally find that skill intensity and the number of input suppliers are additionally important. One result of interest in this table is the negative coefficient on the measure of market thickness in regression 12.3. This result would appear to provide some support for the transactions cost model. In industries in which there are many alternative suppliers of the input the firm is more likely to outsource its production, but only when the R&D intensity of the industry of the purchaser is above the mean. The opposite occurs when the R&D intensity of the purchaser"s industry is below the mean. According to the results in regressions 12.2 and 12.4, greater numbers of alternative input suppliers make it more likely the firm will integrate production.
Finally in Table 13 we separate firms according to whether their industry is skill intensive or not. Again we find that the results are broadly in line with those found in Tables 11 and 12 when we consider only firms whose industries have below mean skill intensity and that the input characteristics are less statistically important when the focus is on industries for above average skill intensity. For example, of the measures of relationship specificity only equipment intensity is significant in regressions 13.1 and 13.3, while both this and skill intensity are significant in regressions 13.2 and 13.4.
Robustness
As a final test of the robustness of our findings we replace the firm effects with the firm characteristics that might determine the choice between outsourcing and FDI and we consider whether the use of observations of input transactions that are offshored generates a selection bias. In Table 14 we replace the firm effects with measures of the size of the firm (employment), TFP, average wage, the volatility of firm"s sales and whether the firm is foreign owned. As the firm effects were also collinear with the industry of the purchaser in our cross-section of data, we also include equivalent measures of our input characteristics measured according to the industry of the purchaser of the input. These include the R&D and investment intensity of the producers" industry, and the Nunn (2007) measure of contract complexity at the level of the final good. To control for possible selection effects we estimate a Heckman selection model. Here, we estimate in the first-stage a regression that models the determinants of offshoring versus domestic sourcing.
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For each 2-digits industry j we define a set of imported inputs as the set of inputs imported by all firms within this industry (Table 1) . Whenever a firm i in industry j imports an input k from this set of inputs, we model the offshoring decision as taking the value 1. If we do not observe a transaction where the firm i imports input k we consider that the firm prefers the domestic sourcing of that particular input and we model the offshoring decision as taking the value 0.
In the second stage, we estimate a regression that models the choice international outsourcing and vertical FDI conditional on a positive outcome in the first stage. We consider that the availability of suppliers at the international level is more likely to influence the 15 The possibility that domestic firms purchase imported inputs through wholesalers and retailers means that the regression perhaps more accurately describes the choice between direct foreign sourcing versus indirect and domestic sourcing.
decision of the firm to source a certain input at the domestic or international level rather than the choice between vertical integration and outsourcing (This assumption is supported by the lack of significance on the Number of Suppliers variable in most regressions). We, thus, use the Number of Supplier variable as an exclusion variable that is included only in the first stage of the Heckman model. Table 14 aggregates the data across countries and controls for 2-digit level input effects.
Regression 14.1 models the decision to offshore a particular input and regressions 14.2 models the choice between outsourcing and FDI once offshored. We begin by noting the insignificance of the inverse Mills variable in the second stage regression, suggesting that selection is not present within our results. The relationship between the input characteristics and the type of offshoring are also largely unaffected by the additional observations and the use of the Heckman approach. We continue to find that inputs that are equipment intensive and skill intensive are less likely to be purchased from a foreign affiliate, whereas differentiated products are more likely to be. Again the noticeable difference with earlier results concerns the R&D variable. We now also find a significant positive effect from the R&D variable on the type of offshoring. Increases in the R&D intensity of the input raise the probability that the input will be purchased from an integrated affiliate, providing further support for the knowledge capital model.
Input characteristics also appear to matter for the decision to offshore. The results in regressions 14.1 suggests that inputs that are equipment intensive and for which there is a wide range of possible suppliers are more likely to be offshored, whereas differentiated products are less likely to be. The skill and R&D intensity have the opposite effect on the decision to offshore. The effect of skill and R&D intensity is negative and significant in regression 14.1. This would seem to suggest that French firms are reluctant to internationalise the production of inputs intensive in knowledge.
Regression 14.1 also suggests that the decision to offshore production of an input is affected by a number of the firm and producer industry variables included in the regression. Following Antras and Helpman (2004) we anticipate that those firms that offshore are likely to differ from those that choose to purchase the same input from domestic sources. We find strong evidence for such differences; firm size, TFP, average wage and foreign ownership are all positively correlated with the decision to offshore. Conditional on the decision to offshore in regression 14.3 we find evidence similar to Defever and Toubal (2007) and Jabbour (2008) that the firms that outsource internationally are more likely to be bigger and more productive, to have higher wage costs and are more likely to be foreign. As discussed by Corcos et al., (2009) , since the data do not cover all offshoring decisions made by French firms these relationships may be sensitive to the coverage of the sample.
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Finally we also find that the probability of offshoring is affected by the characteristics of the industry of the producer. Often these work in the opposite direction to that of the supplier industry variables. For example, the probability of offshoring an input is increasing in the technological intensity of the producers industry in regression 14.1, but decreasing in that of the supplier. It would seem from this that in France firms in more technologically intensive industries purchase less technologically intensive inputs from abroad.
Focusing on the type of offshoring we find that in contrast to the property rights model the measures of relationship specificity do not have opposite signs. The probability of offshoring using FDI is decreasing in both the equipment intensity of the supplier and the investment intensity of the producer, while firms producing differentiated products are more likely to use FDI for differentiated products. Acemoglu et al. (2009) find that that these variables have the opposite signs. We are not clear whether our results for the characteristics of the purchasing industry are driven by the nature of the sample in the same way that the firm variables are, and so we refrain from making strong interpretations that might explain that difference.
Conclusions
16 Corcos et al. (2009) attempt to overcome this problem by merging in French Customs data (labelled EIIG) on imports to the SESSI data. They then assume that all imports not recorded within SESSI are not intra-firm. It is not possible to assess the validity of this assumption, but it does have a strong effect on the relationships found between the mode of offshoring and firm characteristics compared to those reported by Defever and Toubal (2007) . Notes: This table reports the results from a probit regression of the mode of offshoring in which FDI=1 and Outsourcing=0 using data for 1999. The data are aggregated to exclude information on the country of origin of that input. Regressions 1 and 2 are estimated at the firm level, while regression 3 uses information at the firm-group level. All coefficients are the marginal effects estimated at the mean value for the remaining right hand side variables. The cost share variables are dummies indicating the share in total costs. The marginal effects for these variables are reported as the effect on the probability of the mode of offshoring when changing this variable from 0 to 1. *** , ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the input 4-digit level. Notes: This table reports the results from a probit regression of the mode of offshoring in which FDI=1 and Outsourcing=0 using data for 1999. Regressions 1 and 2 are estimated at the firm level, while regression 3 uses information at the firm-group level. The data includes information on the country of origin of the input. All coefficients are the marginal effects estimated at the mean value for the remaining right hand side variables. The cost share variables are dummies indicating the share in total costs. The marginal effects for these variables are reported as the effect on the probability of the mode of offshoring when changing this variable from 0 to 1. *** , ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the input 4-digit level. and Outsourcing=0 using data for 1999. The dependent variable is constructed as the share of imported inputs in total trade of a given HS 4-digit product that come from affiliated parties. *** , ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the input 4-digit level. Notes: This table reports the results from a probit regression of the mode of offshoring in which FDI=1 and Outsourcing=0 using data for 1999. Regressions 1 and 3 use observations for when the industry of the purchaser has above average capital intensity. Regressions 2 and 4 use observations for when the industry of the purchaser has above average capital intensity. All coefficients are the marginal effects estimated at the mean value for the remaining right hand side variables. The cost share variables are dummies indicating the share in total costs. The marginal effects for these variables are reported as the effect on the probability of the mode of offshoring when changing this variable from 0 to 1. *** , ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the input 4-digit level. Notes: This table reports the results from a probit regression of the mode of offshoring in which FDI=1 and Outsourcing=0 using data for 1999. Regressions 1 and 3 use observations for when the industry of the purchaser has above average R&D intensity. Regressions 2 and 4 use observations for when the industry of the purchaser has above average R&D intensity. All coefficients are the marginal effects estimated at the mean value for the remaining right hand side variables. The cost share variables are dummies indicating the share in total costs. The marginal effects for these variables are reported as the effect on the probability of the mode of offshoring when changing this variable from 0 to 1. *** , ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the input 4-digit level. Notes: This table reports the results from a probit regression of the mode of offshoring in which FDI=1 and Outsourcing=0 using data for 1999. Regressions 1 and 3 use observations for when the industry of the purchaser has above average skill intensity. Regressions 2 and 4 use observations for when the industry of the purchaser has above average skill intensity. All coefficients are the marginal effects estimated at the mean value for the remaining right hand side variables. The cost share variables are dummies indicating the share in total costs. The marginal effects for these variables are reported as the effect on the probability of the mode of offshoring when changing this variable from 0 to 1. *** , ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the input 4-digit level. Notes: This table reports the results from a Heckman estimation of the decision to offshore the production of an input (first stage) and the choice between FDI and international outsourcing conditional on a positive decision to offshore (second stage). All coefficients are the marginal effects estimated at the mean value for the remaining right hand side variables. The cost share variables are dummies indicating the share in total costs. The marginal effects for these variables are reported as the effect on the probability of the mode of offshoring when changing this variable from 0 to 1. *** , ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-input level.
The sample to be used in the "International Intra-group exchanges" survey was determined as follows. The identification of international industrial groups is based on the Financial Liaisons survey (LIFI). The LIFI survey provides information on the financial relations between affiliates: it identifies the parent firm as well as the country of origin. The survey was further restricted to affiliates for which the firm has majority control as well as to those belonging to a joint-venture. This generated a sample of 38414 affiliates controlled by 4826 firms. However, only 15205 affiliates (belonging to 4661 firms) were active in international trade. The framework was then further narrowed to affiliates having an industrial or a commercial activity since they represent 96% of the international trade of the international industrial groups. This limited the sample to 12055 affiliates (belonging to 4582 firms). Firms Characteristics: Table 14 presents results based on a regression that include variables representing firms"
characteristics. In these regressions we include the following variables:
 TFP: We apply the semi-parametric methodology proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and estimate total factor productivity industry by industry using the total number of firms in the "EAE" survey.
 Scale: total number of employees  Average wage: ratio of the firm"s wage bill over the total number of employees.
 Investment intensity producer: ratio of investment expenditure over the value added.
This variable is calculated at the firm level.
 Foreign: A dummy indicating if the firm is controlled by a foreign parent firm.
 Volatility: this variable measures the volatility of the firm"s sales. Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the sales, adjusted by the mean of the sales, over a nine years period.
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 Product Differentiation (Final Good): This variable corresponds to the "Relation Specificity" from Nunn (2007) . Nunn (2007) uses the Rauch (1999) classification of differentiated inputs and the input-output table from the United Stated to construct a
